Copyrighting Raw Videotapes: A Restriction of the Free Press? by Tharmaratnam, Mythili
University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1993 Article 22
1993
Copyrighting Raw Videotapes: A Restriction of the
Free Press?
Mythili Tharmaratnam
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal
Forum by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tharmaratnam, Mythili (1993) "Copyrighting Raw Videotapes: A Restriction of the Free Press?," University of Chicago Legal Forum:
Vol. 1993, Article 22.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1993/iss1/22
Copyrighting Raw Videotapes: A
Restriction of the Free Press?
Mythili Tharmaratnamt
The Supreme Court has held that the primary purpose of the
First Amendment's guarantee of a free press is the preservation of
an untrammelled press, not as an end in itself, but as a vital source
of information for the public.1 Indeed, the Court has expressly rec-
ognized that the constitutional guarantee of a free press is "not for
the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us."2
Courts have traditionally construed copyright law as coexten-
sive with this public-minded understanding of the First Amend-
ment.' They have uniformly understood that the Constitution's
copyright clause," which empowers Congress to grant copyrights,
serves primarily to encourage vigorous public debate on important
issues by providing an economic incentive for individuals to create
and disseminate original works of authorship.5 Many courts have
characterized this relationship between the First Amendment and
copyright in idyllic terms, concluding that while the First Amend-
ment "removes obstacles to the free flow of ideas, copyright law
adds positive incentives to encourage the flow."" The Supreme
Court itself has characterized copyright law as an "engine of free
expression."
This ostensibly harmonious relationship between the First
Amendment and copyright collapses, however, when an author's 8
invocation of copyright necessarily impedes the media's ability to
disseminate news to the public. This is graphically demonstrated
t B.A. 1991, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Chicago.
See, for example, Grosjean v Am Press Co., 297 US 233, 250 (1936).
Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 US 374, 389 (1967).
See, for example, Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v Duncan, 744 F2d 1490, 1499 n 14
(11th Cir 1984).
' US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
5 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985).
' Pacific & Southern, 744 F2d at 1499 n 14.
Harper & Row, 471 US at 558. See also Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Conse-
quences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods,
52 Ohio St L J 1343, 1364 (1991).
' In this Comment, "author" within the meaning of copyright law includes videotapers
and photographers.
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by the extension of copyright protection to raw videotapes and
photographs that have fortuitously captured important news
events. The copyrighting of raw news videotapes and photographs
represents the unique situation in which the two internal balancing
mechanisms of copyright law-the fact-expression dichotomy and
the doctrine of fair use-cannot fully accommodate the First
Amendment concerns posed by the blanket extension of copyright
to the visual documentation of news events. The simultaneous fail-
ure of these two mechanisms to ensure media access to copyrighted
news videotapes and photographs, compounded by the costs and
delays inevitably incurred by the media in obtaining these copy-
righted works, results in a seemingly irreconcilable clash between
the right of each individual to copyright his original works and the
right of the press to freely disseminate the underlying factual in-
formation to the public.
The resolution of this constitutional conflict is important for
several reasons. First, the media's increased use of amateur video-
tapes, such as the Rodney King videotape, necessitates a uniform
understanding of the scope of the media's right of access to such
"works of authorship."9 Indeed, as technological progress facili-
tates the visual, rather than written, documentation of news
events, this problem will certainly arise with greater frequency and
urgency. Second, this issue requires a delicate balancing of the me-
dia's First Amendment right to convey news to the public with an
individual's right to profit from his own work. Although many
commentators have suggested various balancing tests, most have
failed to consider the particular First Amendment implications of
copyrighting raw videotapes and photographs. Third, although
many courts have suggested that certain rare instances may war-
rant an independent First Amendment exception to copyright,
none has attempted to define the boundaries of this elusive consti-
tutional privilege. Indeed, the courts' uncertain language reveals an
acute need for guidance as they delineate the scope of this as yet
undefined exception to copyright.
This Comment addresses the unique constitutional concerns
posed by the extension of copyright to raw news videotapes and
photographs, explores why the internal mechanisms of copyright
fail to fully accommodate these First Amendment considerations,
and proposes, as a solution, a limited First Amendment exception
See, for example, Reuters, Texas Officer Is Taped As He Beats Suspect, Ariz Repub-




to copyright. Part I of this Comment summarizes the fundamental
constitutional problem posed by the copyrighting of raw video-
tapes and photographs. Part II describes the current law on this
issue. Part III delineates various policy arguments supporting the
need for a separate, albeit limited, First Amendment exception to
copyright for raw news videotapes and photographs. Finally, Part
IV proposes a standard that defines the boundaries of this First
Amendment exception to copyright in objective and precise terms.
I. THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright
protection to all "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression . 1...  While the statute therefore clearly
affords copyright protection to an author's original expression of a
fact or idea, it implicitly disallows copyright protection of the fact
or idea itself." This fact-expression dichotomy stems from the rec-
ognition that facts exist in the public domain and thus by defini-
tion cannot be "original works of authorship" within the meaning
of section 102(a).'2
The Supreme Court has characterized this fact-expression di-
chotomy as a distinction "between creation and discovery: the first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact;
he or she has merely discovered its existence."' 18 Under this ration-
ale, the Court has held news events to be uncopyrightable "facts,"
because a news event is "not the creation of the writer, but is a
report of matters that are ordinarily publici juris; it is the history
of the day."" In fact, in excluding the discovery of news events
from the scope of copyright protection, the Supreme Court has
ruled conclusively that it "is not to be supposed that the framers
of the Constitution .. . intended to confer upon one who might
happen to be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right
for any period to spread the knowledge of it."' 5
Generally, this definitional dichotomy between fact and ex-
pression effectively balances copyright and First Amendment con-
cerns, permitting individuals to protect their original works of au-
10 17 USC § 102(a) (1988).
" Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Serv Co., Inc., 111 S Ct 1282, 1287
(1991). See also HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess, in 5 USCCAN 5659, 5670 (1976).
" Feist, 111 S Ct at 1288.
" Id.
" Intl News Serv v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 234 (1918).
Is Id.
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thorship without denying the knowledge. of the substance of those
works to the public or the media. As Professor Melville Nimmer
describes:
[T]he idea-expression line represents an acceptable defi-
nitional balance as between copyright and free speech in-
terests. In some degree it encroaches upon freedom of
speech in that it abridges the right to reproduce the "ex-
pression" of others, but this is justified by the greater
public good in the copyright encouragement of creative
works. In some degree it encroaches upon- the author's
right to control his works in that it renders his "ideas"
per se unprotectible, but this is justified by the greater
public need for free access to ideas as a part of the demo-
cratic dialogue.16
This definitional dichotomy between fact and expression
therefore generally provides an effective balancing mechanism be-
tween the First Amendment and copyright law. In rare instances,
however, such as in the fortuitous filming of a unique news event,
the discovery of a fact merges inextricably with the author's ex-
pression of that fact, causing the fact-expression dichotomy to col-
lapse. 17 Indeed, raw videotapes and photographs are unique in that
the process by which the cameraman "discovers" the news event is
contemporaneously and fortuitously merged with the process by
which he "expresses" this fact on film. In these rare but important
instances, courts are unable to definitionally categorize the raw
news videotape as either an uncopyrightable discovery of a news
event or a copyrightable expression of that event. Courts are thus
forced to choose between the individual's right to profit from his
copyrightable "expression" of the news event on film, and the me-
dia's right to make the uncopyrightable facts freely available to the
public. This seemingly impossible choice between two constitu-
tional mandates forms the crux of the legal problem that this Com-
ment seeks to resolve.
16 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L Rev 1180, 1192-93 (1970).
"' Melville Nimmer has argued that the fact-expression dichotomy in raw news films,
such as the film of the Kennedy assassination or the photograph of the My Lai massacre, is
so "wedded" that "[tihe photographic expression, not merely the idea, [becomes] essential if
the public [is] to fully understand what occurred .... " Id at 1197.
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II. THE CURRENT LAW .
Courts have liberally extended copyright protection to those
works of authorship in which the fact-expression dichotomy is
clearly demarcated. When this definitional dichotomy between fact
and expression collapses, however, as in most raw videotapes and
photographs, so too does the uniformity in the law.
A. When the Fact-Expression Dichotomy Is Unambiguous
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc."6 embodies the liberal
standard under which courts have generally afforded copyright
protection to any work of authorship in which the fact-expression
dichotomy is unambiguous. In considering the copyrightability of a
telephone directory, the Supreme Court in Feist held that copy-
right protection must extend to any work "independently created
by the author" that possesses at least some "minimal," or even
"extremely low," level of creativity. 9 The Court ruled that under
this liberal standard of copyright, only those works such as tele-
phone directories that are so "mechanical or routine as to require
no creativity whatsoever" are uncopyrightable2
The Feist Court's reasoning stems from a line of cases that
extend generous copyright protection to artistic photographs and
films. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v Sarony,2' for example,
the seminal case on the copyrightability of photographs, the Su-
preme Court held that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was copyright-
able because the photograph represented the photographer's "orig-
inal mental conception to which he gave visible form by posing the
said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging
the costume, . . . arranging the subject so as to present graceful
outlines, [and] arranging and disposing the light and shade
. ... ,, The Supreme Court echoed this broad understanding of
copyright in Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co.,2 3 a decision
which Judge Learned Hand subsequently construed as mandating
the copyrightability of all photographs. 4 Indeed, Judge Hand con-
18 11 S Ct at 1282.
Id at 1287.
,o Id at 1296.
21 111 US 53 (1884).
8' Id at 60.
2 188 US 239, 250 (1903).
" Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F 932 (S D NY
1921), aft'd, 281 F 83 (2d Cir 1922).
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cluded that under Bleistein, "no photograph, however simple, can
be unaffected by the personal influence of the author."25
In recent years, many courts have upheld the copyrightability
of videotapes under this liberal standard. In Easter Seal Society v
Playboy Enterprises,6 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a
news videotape of a Mardi Gras parade taken by a public televi-
sion station was copyrightable. In so holding, the court noted that
the television station "did not simply set up one camera on a tri-
pod, turn it on and sit down to watch. Instead, it worked coopera-
tively and dynamically with the performers to create the field
tapes. 217 Similarly, in Los Angeles News Service v Tu1o, 2' the
Ninth Circuit ruled that a news videotape of an airline crash and a
train wreck was copyrightable because the cameraman chose the
particular camera lenses, angles, exposures, and portions of events
to film.2 These cases suggest that videotapes and photographs are
liberally and uniformly afforded copyright protection so long as the
fact-expression dichotomy in the works is clearly defined.
B. When the Fact-Expression Dichotomy Is Unclear
By contrast, when the fact-expression dichotomy in a particu-
lar work of authorship is ambiguous, the law of copyright is in dis-
array. Indeed, courts have espoused three distinctly divergent re-
sponses to First Amendment challenges to copyrighted works in
which the fact-expression dichotomy is unclear. First, some courts
have expressly acknowledged the existence of a limited First
Amendment exception to copyright, but have left this exception
purposefully undefined."0 Second, other courts have flatly rejected
a First Amendment copyright exception independent of the doc-
" Id at 934.
H 815 F2d 323 (5th Cir 1987).
17 Id at 337.
2 973 F2d 791 (9th Cir 1992).
29 Id at 794. See also Cable News Network, Inc. v Video Monitoring Services of
America, Inc., 940 F2d 1471, 1485 (11th Cir 1991), vacated on other grounds, 959 F2d 188
(11th Cir 1992) (a television newscast is copyrightable because the editors selected, coordi-
nated, and arranged the materials used); Baltimore Orioles v Major League Baseball Play-
ers Association, 805 F2d 663, 668 (7th Cir 1986) (the choice of camera angles and shots
made during the live broadcast of a baseball game renders the broadcast copyrightable);
Time, Inc. v Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F Supp 130, 143 (S D NY 1968) (choice of cam-
era, film, lens, and location renders the filming of the Kennedy assassination copyrightable;
the court concluded that although the film was copyrightable, its use was protected by the
fair use doctrine).
'1 See, for example, Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v Am Broadcast-
ing Co., 621 F2d 57, 61 n 6 (2d Cir 1980).
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trine of fair use,31 and have instead maintained that the fair use
doctrine is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any First Amend-
ment concerns. 2 Third, one court has explicitly adopted general
First Amendment right-to-access arguments to protect the usually
impermissible use of a copyrighted work, but unlike the first ap-
proach, did not premise the application of this First Amendment
reasoning on the collapse of the fact-expression dichotomy." These
three conflicting responses to First Amendment copyright chal-
lenges reveal an acute need for uniformity in the law.
Under the first approach, courts have suggested that in rare
instances, the collapse of the fact-expression dichotomy in copy-
righted raw films or photographs warrants a First Amendment ex-
ception to the general copyright protection extended to these vide-
otapes or photographs.84 These courts, however, have expressly
refused to define the boundaries of this elusive constitutional ex-
ception to copyright, and have instead generally decided the cases
on other grounds.35
The district court decision in Time, Inc. v Bernard Geis Asso-
ciates36 has inadvertently served as the basis for this first ap-
proach. In Geis, the court addressed the copyrightability of a
movie taken by a bystander along a parade route who, by "sheer
happenstance," captured the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy on film.3 7 Although initially noting the film's copyright-
ability, the district court concluded that the "public interest in
having the fullest information available on the murder of President
Kennedy" justified the use of the film without the copyright
owner's consent.38
Although it is unclear whether the Geis decision was based
solely on a freedom of the press rationale, 9 many courts have sub-
sequently construed it as a viable basis for a First Amendment ex-
"1 For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see Part III(B).
3 See, for example, New Era Publications Intl v Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F2d 576,
584 (2d Cir 1989).
" Triangle Publications, Inc. v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F Supp 875, 883
(S D Fla 1978), aft'd, 626 F2d 1171 (5th Cir 1980).
See, for example, Iowa State Research Foundation, 621 F2d at 61 n 6.
SB See, for example, Roy Export Co. v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 672 F2d
1095 (2d Cir 1982).
86, 293 F Supp at 130.
Id at 131.
Id at 146.
See Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic As Well As
the Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw U L Rev 193, 207 (1980).
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ception to copyright for films and photographs.' In Iowa State
University Research Foundation, Inc. v American Broadcasting
Co.,"' for example, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Ken-
nedy assassination film in Geis represented the "unique instance"
in which "it is at least arguable that the informational value of
that film cannot be separated from the photographer's expression
... thereby indicating that both should be in the public do-
main."' 2 In so ruling, however, the court noted that the film at is-
sue, a student-produced biographical movie about a champion
wrestler, did not fall within this "limited category."'43
In contrast, the second approach adopted by courts when
faced with a First Amendment challenge to copyright is to flatly
refuse to acknowledge the existence of a First Amendment excep-
tion to copyright independent of the doctrine of fair use. These
courts, such as the Second Circuit in New Era Publications Inter-
national v Henry Holt & Co., Inc.,"' instead maintain that the fair
use doctrine sufficiently accommodates all First Amendment con-
cerns, thus precluding the need for an independent constitutional
exception to copyright.' In New Era, the owner of the copyright to
the writings of L. Ron Hubbard brought an action for copyright
Indeed, one scholar has observed that the courts have construed the Geis decision as
a "first amendment limitation on copyright, thinly clothed in a misapplication of the fair
use doctrine." W. Warren Hamel, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First Amendment Privi-
lege for News Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19 Colum J L & Soc Probs 253, 268
(1985).
621 F2d 57 (2d Cir 1980).
Id at 61 n 6.
4' Id. The Ninth Circuit echoed this acknowledgment of a limited First Amendment
exception to copyright in Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v McDonald's
Corp., 562 F2d 1157 (9th Cir 1977). The court recognized that there may exist "certain rare
instances when first amendment considerations will operate to limit copyright protection for
graphic expressions of newsworthy events." Id at 1171. The court, however, ruled that the
work of authorship at issue in the case was neither graphic nor newsworthy, and thus did
not trigger any such First Amendment privilege. Id. See also Roy Export, 672 F2d at 1100
(reluctantly acknowledging in dicta that in certain "rare" works of authorship, such as the
Kennedy assassination film, the informational value may arguably suggest that it should
rightfully belong in the public domain); Jackson v MPI Home Video, 694 F Supp 483, 489
(N D Ill 1988) (holding that although some videotapes may warrant First Amendment pro-
tection, a videotape of Jesse Jackson giving a political speech did "not seem to be compara-
ble in degree or quality" to a film of the Kennedy assassination or a photograph of the My
Lai Massacre); Encyclopaedia Brittanica Educational Corp. v Crooks, 542 F Supp 1156,
1181 (W D NY 1982) (noting that when information contained in a film is "inextricably
related to the film's expression of that information," such as in the Kennedy assassination
film, use of the film to disseminate the facts may be justified).
873 F2d 576 (2d Cir 1989).
" Id at 584. The doctrine of fair use, codified in 17 USC § 107 (1976), provides that
certain uses of copyrighted material are "fair uses" of that material, and thus do not consti-
tute copyright infringement.
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infringement against the publisher of Hubbard's biography for re-
producing many of Hubbard's personal writings without his con-
sent."6 In rejecting the argument that an independent First
Amendment exception to copyright protects this use of a public
figure's writings, the Second Circuit ruled that an author's "expres-
sion of an idea, as distinguished from the idea itself, is not consid-
ered subject to the public's 'right to know.' "" The court held in-
stead that the fair use doctrine is sufficiently flexible to
accommodate these First Amendment concerns, noting that its
"observation that the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of
first amendment in the copyright field . . . never has been
repudiated." 8
The third approach adopted in response to First Amendment
challenges to copyright is the express espousal of First Amendment
logic to protect the usually impermissible use of a copyrighted
work. In contrast to the first approach, however, this last approach
is not premised on the collapse of the fact-expression dichotomy,
but is rooted instead in generalized First Amendment right-to-ac-
cess arguments. In many ways, therefore, this last approach resem-
bles fair use analysis.
Only one court, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, in Triangle Publications, Inc. v
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.,49 has explicitly adopted this last
approach. In Triangle Publications, the court addressed whether
the defendant's publication of its competitor's TV Guide cover on
its own TV Book cover constituted copyright infringement.5 0 The
court, in holding that the defendant's unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's magazine cover did not constitute copyright infringe-
ment, explicitly moved beyond the doctrine of fair use, finding that
the defendant's "comparative advertising" behavior was indepen-
40 New Era, 873 F2d at 577.
47 Id at 584.
48 Id. See also Wojnarowicz v Am Family Association, 745 F Supp 130 (S D NY 1990);
Twin Peaks Productions v Publications Intl, 778 F Supp 1247 (S D NY 1991).
Some scholars agree that the fair use doctrine is sufficiently flexible to accommodate all
First Amendment copyright concerns. See Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment:
Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 Tulane L Rev 135, 160 (1984); David E. Shipley, Con-
flicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v.
Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L Rev 983, 995; Note, Harper & Row, Publishers v Nation
Enterprises: Emasculating the Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First
Amendment Interests, 79 Nw U L Rev 587, 621 (1984). This Comment addresses the weak-
ness of this argument with respect to raw videotapes and photographs in Part III(B).
445 F Supp 875 (S D Fla 1978).
Id at 876.
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dently privileged by the First Amendment's interest in securing
public access to important facts." Relying heavily on the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech,52 the court con-
cluded that comparative advertising, when undertaken in a serious
manner, represents an important source of information for the ed-
ucation of consumers in a free market system; the court ruled that
to extend copyright to this activity would therefore place it "in
jeopardy of unconstitutionality."" The significance of the court's
holding in Triangle Publications is attenuated, however, by the
fact that the Fifth Circuit, in considering the case upon appeal,
failed to address the First Amendment issue and instead resolved
the case through conventional fair use analysis.5 '
The Supreme Court has failed to squarely address these three
seemingly irreconcilable understandings of a First Amendment ex-
ception to copyright. Although the Court broached the issue of a
First Amendment exception to copyright in Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises,55 it addressed only whether
First Amendment concerns warrant the expansion of the fair use
doctrine for copyrighted works in which the fact-expression dichot-
omy is unambiguous; the Court therefore failed to include in its
analysis copyrighted works, such as raw videotapes and photo-
graphs, that are peculiarly characterized by a collapse of the fact-
expression dichotomy.
In Harper & Row, the Court considered whether the defend-
ant magazine's printing of excerpts of President Gerald Ford's un-
published memoirs constituted a "fair use" of the copyrighted
work. The Court reasoned that in light of the First Amendment
protections already embodied in copyright's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and the lati-
tude for scholarship traditionally afforded by the doctrine of fair
use, there exists "no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use
to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copy-
right." ' The Court thus rejected the argument that the news-
" Id at 882-83.
2 Note that in 1976, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to com-
mercial speech. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 US 748 (1976). In 1980, however, the Supreme Court limited this protection of commer-
cial speech. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Serv Commission of New York,
447 US 557 (1980).
Triangle Publications, 445 F Supp at 883.
See Triangle Publications, Inc. v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F2d 1171,
1178 (5th Cir 1980).
" 471 US at 539.
" Id at 560.
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worthiness of a written work can justify the unauthorized copying
of an author's expression.57
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Harper & Row ostensibly
suggests an unwillingness to grant special copyright exceptions to
newsworthy works of authorship. The Court, in limiting its holding
to written works of authorship, however, failed to address those
copyrighted works, such as raw videotapes and photographs, that
are peculiarly characterized by a collapse of the fact-expression di-
chotomy. Therefore, the current law's treatment of an independent
First Amendment copyright privilege for raw videotapes and pho-
tographs remains unclear.5
III. THE NEED FOR A LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TO
COPYRIGHT
The unique First Amendment concerns posed by the extension
of copyright to raw news videotapes and photographs, coupled with
the inevitable costs and delays incurred by the media in legally
obtaining permission to use such works, reveal an acute need for a
First Amendment exception to copyright, albeit a limited and
strictly defined one. This Part of the Comment examines several
factors suggesting that a limited First Amendment exception to
copyright for raw videotapes and photographs is not only desirable,
but indeed justified and necessary.
A. The Failure of the Fact-Expression Dichotomy
When the fact-expression dichotomy in a work is unambigu-
ous, the author can copyright the work without sacrificing the me-
dia's ability to inform the public of its substance. When the fact-
expression dichotomy is blurred, however, these free press con-
cerns remain unresolved.
The extension of copyright protection to amateur news video-
tapes and photographs constitutes one of these rare instances in
which the fact-expression dichotomy is so ambiguous that courts
cannot distinguish an uncopyrightable news event from the copy-
rightable expression of that event. On the one hand, an amateur
cameraman's documentation of a news event through a "tangible
" Id at 557.
8 A few commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Harper &
Row definitively rejects an independent First Amendment exception to copyright. See
Shipley, 1986 BYU L Rev at 997-998 (cited in note 48); Note, Copyright and the First
Amendment: Nurturing the Seeds for Harvest, 65 Neb L Rev 631, 644 (1986). This Com-
ment discusses the weakness of this contention in Part III(D).
4171
428 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
medium of expression," whether film or videotape, is, by statutory
definition, his copyrightable "expression" of the news event.59 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court clearly held in International
News Service v Associated Press60 that the discovery of a news
event is an uncopyrightable "fact" under the fact-expression
dichotomy.6 1
Because in raw videotapes and photographs, the process by
which the cameraman "discovers" the event merges with the pro-
cess by which he "expresses" this fact on film, the fact-expression
dichotomy cannot accommodate raw news videotapes and photo-
graphs as easily as it does the print media. In fact, raw news video-
tapes and photographs clearly resist classification within the fact-
expression dichotomy as either uncopyrightable facts or as copy-
rightable expressions of those facts. Therefore, the author's right
to protect his "expression" of the event fundamentally conflicts
with the media's ability to gain full access to the underlying
"facts" of the event.62 An independent First Amendment copyright
exception would ensure that the courts do not sacrifice the public
dissemination of news events to copyright simply because the dis-
covery of those events is fortuitously and simultaneously captured
on film.
B. The Failure of the Doctrine of Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use similarly fails to accommodate the
First Amendment concerns posed by the copyrighting of raw vide-
otapes and photographs. Fair use is a "privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reason-
able manner without his consent." 63 In determining whether the
use of a particular copyrighted work constitutes "fair use," courts
must consider four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the
use; (2) the effect of that use upon the value of or the market for
" See 17 USC § 102(a) (1988).
6o 248 US at 215.
61 Id at 234 (ruling that "[i]t is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution
. . . intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event
the exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it").
6 Melville Nimmer has argued that where expression and idea in a work of authorship
are "wedded," "[n]o amount of words describing the 'idea' ... [can] substitute for the pub-
lic insight gained through the photographs." Nimmer, 17 UCLA L Rev at 1197 (cited in note
16). The difference between Nimmer's and this Comment's understanding of the collapse of
the fact-expression dichotomy will become clear in Part IV.
13 Harper & Row, 471 US at 549 (quoting Horace G. Ball, Law of Copyright and Liter-
ary Property 260 (Matthew Bender & Co., 1944)).
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the copyrighted work; (3) the nature of the copyrighted work; and
(4) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work
used.4 Although the Copyright Act expressly enumerates newsre-
porting as one of those uses of copyrighted material favored under
the fair use doctrine," the courts' construction of these four factors
suggests that the fair use doctrine will rarely protect the media's
use of raw news videotapes or photographs.
The Supreme Court has held that under the first element of
fair use analysis, any commercial or for-profit use of a copyrighted
work by anyone other than the copyright owner is presumptively
unfair. 6 Given the commercial nature of newsreporting in the
United States, therefore, even the most liberal application of the
fair use doctrine will rarely accommodate the media's use of raw
news videotapes for the purpose of news reporting. Indeed, the
Supreme Court, in Harper & Row, stated that even if the media's
use of the copyrighted material for news reporting is not purely
commercial, the use remains presumptively unfair since the "crux
of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of
the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the cus-
tomary price."6 8
Under the second element of fair use analysis, if the use of the
copyrighted work detrimentally affects the marketability and value
of the copyrighted work, the use is not a "fair use." Courts have
concluded that when the use of the copyrighted material is consid-
ered a "commercial" use for purposes of the first factor, the effect
on the marketability of the copyrighted work is-deemed presump-
tively harmful for purposes of the second factor. 9 Because the me-
dia's use of raw news videotapes is usually considered a commer-
cial use under the first factor, its effect upon the marketability and
value of the videotape will therefore generally be presumed
detrimental.
See 17 USC § 107 (1976).
See id.
See Sony Corp. of America v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417, 449 (1984).
See also 17 USC § 107 (1976); Harper & Row, 471 US at 562; Pacific & Southern, 744 F2d
at 1496.
" Hamel, 19 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 261 (cited in note 40).
Harper & Row, 471 US at 562.
" See, for example, Financial Information, Inc. v Moody's Investors Serv, Inc., 751
F2d 501, 510 (2d Cir 1984). Indeed, if the intended use is for commercial gain, no actual
harm need be shown in order for the use to be presumed unfair. Maxtone-Graham v Burt-
chaell, 803 F2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir 1986).
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Under the third prong of fair use analysis, courts have seldom
given special consideration to the use of copyrighted works that are
of great public interest or importance, suggesting that even news-
worthy raw news videotapes will rarely be favored under the fair
use doctrine. 0 In Iowa State Research Foundation,1 for example,
the Second Circuit held that the public interest in the free flow of
information is insufficient to deem a use fair, ruling that "[tihe fair
use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a
court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying
work contains material of possible public importance. '7 2 Moreover,
the Supreme Court in Harper & Row expressly refused to give the
works of a public figure specialized treatment under the fair use
doctrine.7 Thus, courts will seldom give heightened consideration
'to the media's use of even important news videotapes under the
fair use doctrine.7 '
Under the fourth element of fair use analysis, courts have dis-
favored the use of copyrighted material if the alleged infringer's
use is either qualitatively or quantitatively substantial. For in-
stance, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that the use of even a small
portion of a news broadcast can be qualitatively substantial if the
portion used is "especially significant. '75 Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has held that any "verbatim" use of a copyrighted
work is evidence of a quantitatively substantial taking of the
work.7 6 This strict understanding of the fourth factor is generally
fatal to the fair use doctrine's protection of raw videotape and pho-
tograph use because such use is necessarily "verbatim" and usually
encompasses the most newsworthy portions of the film. Thus, me-
'0 Indeed, only Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v Random House, Inc., 366 F2d 303 (2d Cir
1966), a copyright infringement case involving the media's unauthorized use of Howard
Hughes's biography, has explicitly considered the public interest in its fair use analysis. See
id at 309.
" 621 F2d at 57.
" Id at 61.
11 Harper & Row, 471 US at 557. See also Haberman v Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F
Supp 201, 209-10 (D Mass 1986) (refusing to follow Geis's holding that the public interest in
a copyrighted work or the public's view of the work's merit should be considered in fair use
analysis).
", Note that although the district court in Geis considered the "public interest" in its
decision to protect the use of the Kennedy assassination films, this understanding of the fair
use doctrine has since been discounted. See Harper & Row, 471 US at 539. Indeed, most
courts construe Geis as having established a separate First Amendment exception to copy-
right, not as having expanded the scope of the fair use doctrine to encompass public interest
considerations. See, for example, Roy Export, 672 F2d at 1095.
7' Pacific & Southern, 744 F2d at 1497 n 11.
7 Harper & Row, 471 US at 565.
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dia use of these news films will not likely be protected under the
doctrine of fair use.
As presently construed, therefore, the fair use doctrine will
rarely serve as a refuge for the use of copyrighted raw videotapes
or photographs by the media. Although some commentators have
argued that the fair use doctrine sufficiently protects First Amend-
ment considerations, these commentators have found the doctrine
adequate only by including factors clearly excluded by traditional
fair use analysis. For example, one commentator included in her
fair use analysis the necessity of obtaining the copyrighted mate-
rial, a factor not usually considered by the courts.77 Another com-
mentator has argued that the commercial nature of the use should
not preclude its characterization as a fair use, although courts have
consistently considered this the most important element of fair use
analysis.7 8 Still other commentators have characterized fair use
analysis as taking into account the public interest served by the
use of the copyrighted work, a factor explicitly ignored in settled
fair use analysis.7 9 This need to distort the fair use doctrine in or-
der to accommodate First Amendment concerns itself suggests the
need for a constitutional exception to copyright independent of the
doctrine of fair use.
C. The Irrelevance of Copyright's Economic Underpinnings to
Raw Videotapes
Courts have uniformly recognized that the principal rationale
underlying copyright law is that copyright, by establishing a mar-
ketable right to the use of one's expression, creates an economic
incentive for individuals to create and disseminate original works
of authorship. 0 "[T]he ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimu-
late [the creation of useful works] for the general public good."'"
Although this incentive justifies the extension of copyright to
original works of authorship, it provides no basis for extending
copyright to raw videotapes and photographs. First, extending
copyright privileges to raw videotapes or photographs adds no in-
77 See Comment, 59 Tulane L Rev at 156 (cited in note 48).
71 Note, 65 Neb L Rev at 646 (cited in note 58).
71 See Comment, A Regulatbry Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment
Conflict, 35 Emory L J 163, 192 (1986); Note, When 'Fair is Foul': A Narrow Reading of the
Fair Use Doctrine in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 72 Cornell L Rev
218, 240 (1986); Note, A New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the Fair Use Doctrine,
34 NY L Sch L Rev 267, 299 (1989).
SO Harper & Row, 471 US at 558.
61 Id at 558, quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 US 151, 156 (1975).
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centive to create similar news films. Indeed, given the inherently
fortuitous nature of such raw videotapes and photographs, amateur
photographers will not engage in more frequent videotaping or
photography in the hopes that they will stumble upon a news-
worthy event from which they can profit. Because the promise of
copyright protection is not necessary to encourage the production
of raw videotapes or photographs, establishing a First Amendment
copyright exception for raw videotapes and photographs creates no
economic disincentive against the fortuitous filming of important
news events.
Second, the creation of a First Amendment copyright excep-
tion for raw videotapes and photographs will not likely discourage
the public dissemination of these films. Unlike artistic works of au-
thorship, the value of raw videotapes lies entirely in their public
worth, rather than in their private, aesthetic importance. The ama-
teur cameraman will derive no benefit from keeping the videotape
for himself, and can profit only by selling the work to the media. 2
Unlike other original works of authorship, therefore, the extent of
public access to a raw news videotape or photograph will most
probably be unaffected by the creation of a limited First Amend-
ment exception to copyright."
D. Harper & Row Does Not Preclude a First Amendment Copy-
right Exception
Harper & Row does not preclude the creation of a First
Amendment exception to copyright independent of the doctrine of
fair use. First, the Supreme Court's ruling in Harper & Row en-
compassed only those works of authorship in which the fact-
expression dichotomy effectively carries out its threshold function
of balancing First Amendment concerns with copyright considera-
tions. Indeed, the Harper & Row Court based its reasoning largely
82 The only exception to this general statement that the "author" of a raw videotape
will not benefit from keeping the videotape for himself is a situation in which the author of
the videotape wants to protect someone whose illicit activities he has inadvertently captured
on film. In this situation, the economic rationale for copyright fails anyway. Indeed, in this
situation, a First Amendment exception to copyright would ensure public access to the raw
videotape or photograph when traditional copyright law certainly could not.
,83 Although, under a First Amendment exception to copyright, it may appear that a
cameraman would receive less money for selling a raw videotape or photograph to the press,
under the third prong of this Comment's proposed standard, full copyright protection is still
preserved as to those raw videotapes or photographs already accessible to the public. Thus,
in most instances, the copyright holder will still be able to sell his work for the same
amount. See Part IV.
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on the express assumption that the facts contained in President
Ford's memoirs were easily distinguishable from his expression of
those facts. 4 The Court thus implicitly left open the possibility for
an exception to copyright for those works of authorship, such as
raw news videotapes, in which the fact-expression dichotomy is not
so clearly demarcated.85
Second, Harper & Row rejected a public figure exception to
copyright on the grounds that if copyright protection was denied to
non-fiction works, "there would be little incentive to create or
profit in financing such memoirs .. ."'a Raw videotapes and pho-
tographs, however, which are unaffected by the economic incen-
tives provided by copyright, are clearly distinguishable.
Finally, the Court expressly based its reasoning on the fact
that the alleged infringer in Harper & Row had failed to assert
''any actual necessity for circumventing the copyright scheme with
respect to the types of works and users at issue here.""7 The Court
thus left open the possibility that a First Amendment copyright
exception may be warranted when there exists a true need for pub-
lic access to a particular work of authorship.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT COPYRIGHT
EXCEPTION
This Comment proposes a limited constitutional exception to
copyright that accommodates the First Amendment's promise of
media access to important news events, without manipulating the
First Amendment to privilege copyrighted works that do not truly
contribute to public debate. Under this proposed standard, the
First Amendment privileges the media's use of copyrighted raw
videotapes or photographs only if: (1) the fact-expression dichot-
omy of the source material is so collapsed that the work cannot be
definitionally categorized as either an uncopyrightable discovery of
a news event or a copyrightable expression of that news event; (2)
the material uniquely contributes to public debate about a news
event; and (3) public access to the raw videotape or photograph is
Harper & Row, 471 US at 556.
8 Even those commentators who argue that Harper & Row settles the issue of a general
First Amendment exception to copyright acknowledge that Harper & Row conflicts with the
special free press problems posed by the extension of copyright to works of authorship such
as the Kennedy assassination film. See Shipley, 1986 BYU L Rev at 1040-41 (cited in note
48).
" Harper & Row, 471 US at 557.
87 Id.
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otherwise unavailable through any public or costless medium such
as television.
The first prong privileges only the use of those copyrighted
videotapes or photographs in which the fact-expression dichotomy
is so collapsed that the uncopyrightable discovery of a news event
cannot be separated from the copyrightable expression of that
news event. This prong recognizes that when this merger of fact
and expression occurs, the extension of copyright would necessarily
grant to the copyright holder an unconstitutional monopoly over
the facts of the news event itself."8 Scholars such as Melville Nim-
mer have defined this fact-expression merger as it applies to pho-
tographs and videotapes as the point at which the visual embodi-
ment of the idea "[becomes] essential if the public [i]s to fully
understand what occurred . . . ."s Such a vague definition of the
collapse of the fact-expression dichotomy, however, invites overin-
clusive and unnecessarily normative inquiries by the courts.90 The
difficulty of the Nimmer standard is evidenced by the fact that
although many courts have made positive references to Nimmer's
test in dicta, none has attempted to apply his standard to the case
at hand."1
This proposed standard, by contrast, provides a clearer test
for the fact-expression merger. Under this standard, the fact-ex-
pression dichotomy is deemed to have collapsed only when the dis-
covery process is so merged with the process by which the photog-
rapher expressed this discovery on film that the raw videotape
cannot easily be categorized as an uncopyrightable discovery of a
fact or as a copyrightable expression of that fact: this merger oc-
curs only when the photographer does not employ conscious selec-
tivity in choosing which "facts" to include or omit in the videotape
or photograph. If the photographer, rather than simply "absorb-
" Many commentators have suggested this element to be the crux of a First Amend-
ment exception to copyright. These commentators, however, have made this observation
conclusorily, failing to provide a standard under which courts can determine if in fact the
fact-expression dichotomy has collapsed. See Hamel, 19 Colum J L & Soc Probs at 264
(cited in note 40); Note, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enterprises: A Distortion
of the Fair Use Doctrine, 24 Houston L Rev 363, 378 (1987).
" Nimmer, 17 UCLA L Rev at 1197 (cited in note 16).
"0 Other commentators have also defined the merger of the fact-expression dichotomy
in excessively vague terms. One scholar, for example, concluded that the fact-expression
dichotomy is merged when the expression is so invaluable as to warrant the court's permis-
sion to use it. Cecilia Loving, Fair Use Protection for News Reporting: Where Does the
First Amendment Stand?, 13 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 647, 651-52 (1985). Such tests are
unhelpful because they fail to provide clear standards which courts can follow.
9' See, for example, Roy Export, 672 F2d at 1099; Iowa State Research Foundation,
621 F2d at 61 n 6.
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ing" the facts mechanically with his camera, consciously compiles
or arranges the facts to his liking before expressing them on film,
there is no true merger of discovery and documentation. This first
prong thus necessarily excludes from this First Amendment copy-
right exception any artistic videotapes or photographs in which the
author clearly chooses which facts or ideas to include."e
As an example, both the Rodney King videotape and the film
of the Kennedy assassination satisfy this prong. Although in both
films, the cameramen made the conscious decision to film, they
were unable to "choreograph" or "direct" the event once the film-
ing commenced. The cameramen simply absorbed the facts with
the camera as they occurred and had no conscious control over the
"fact sequence" captured on film. The process of discovery and ex-
pression thus were so merged that the films cannot easily be cate-
gorized within the fact-expression dichotomy. The extension of
copyright to such films would grant the copyright holder an uncon-
stitutional monopoly over the discovery of the news events.
In construing the first prong, courts must resist inquiry into
whether the cameraman made artistic choices such as decisions
about the camera angle, kind of film, or type of lens. These choices
go to the originality of the work rather than to its constitutional
distinction between fact and expression, and are characteristic of
almost any filming. Indeed, even the Geis court acknowledged that
Abraham Zapruder made artistic choices in filming the assassina-
tion of John Kennedy. 3 This proposed standard, by contrast, asks
whether the cameraman consciously selected which facts to include
and omit. It thus addresses not the artistic originality of the film,
but rather the constitutional implications of the merger of the dis-
covery of a news event and the expression of that news event on
film.
The first prong, in addition to recognizing the pragmatic need
for a mechanism by which to accommodate First Amendment in-
terests when the fact-expression dichotomy cannot do so, also rec-
ognizes the importance of securing to the author of an original
work a limited property interest in his own creation. The first
9' One commentator has in fact suggested that the fact-expression dichotomy in certain
political art works can be so merged that the expression becomes essential to understanding
the underlying political statement. Note, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93
Yale L J 1565, 1571 (1984). This argument, however, calls for too deep an encroachment
upon copyright's primary aim of encouraging the creation of important works; unlike raw
news videotapes or photographs, the creation and dissemination of political art work can be
influenced by the economic incentives provided by copyright.
" Geis, 293 F Supp at 143.
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prong limits the scope of the First Amendment's protection of raw
vi ,eotapes and photographs to only those films which, if copy-
righted, would grant the copyright holder an unconstitutional mo-
nopoly over a news event. By so restricting the reach of the First
Anrendment's protection of raw videotapes and photographs, this
pron g guarantees that this proposed First Amendment exception
to copyright does not unnecessarily or without constitutional war-
rant infringe upon the ability of each individual to determine the
destiny of his own work.
The second prong provides that the First Amendment privi-
leges the media's use of copyrighted raw videotapes or photographs
only if the facts captured by the film uniquely contribute to the
public debate about the news event. This uniqueness requirement
is satisfied if the videotape or photograph provides the public with
either a more detailed understanding of or a greater access to a
news event than would otherwise be available."4 As noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles News Service v Tullo, 5 the First
Amendment does not privilege a news service's use of copyrighted
footage if there is "no showing that other depictions and reports of
the [events] [a]re unavailable or omit[ ] information vital to the
public understanding of the events .... .
Both the Rodney King videotape and the Kennedy assassina-
tion film satisfy the second prong. The Rodney King videotape, by
providing the public with access to visual evidence of the beating
of an African-American motorist, gave the public more meaningful
access to the news event than what may have been reported in the
back pages of newspapers. Likewise, the Kennedy assassination
tape, by capturing facts that could not be seen by the naked eye,
provided the public with a more detailed understanding of the
shooting than that provided by bystanders or other films.
" Some commentators have alluded to this criterion as a "necessity" standard under
which a First Amendment copyright exception is justified only when there exists a demon-
strable inability to convey the message to the public without actually using the copyrighted
material. For example, one scholar has argued that a First Amendment exception is war-
ranted only when the use of the copyrighted work is necessary to convey an "accurate and
efficacious" message to the public. See Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First
Amendment: Freedom or Monopoly of Expression?, 14 Pepperdine L Rev 571, 598 (1987).
Yet another scholar has argued that a First Amendment exception is warranted only when
the defendant needs to use the copyrighted material to make the desired point. Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Ex-
pression, 67 Cal L Rev 283, 306-07 (1979).




By privileging only films containing unique facts about a news
event, the second prong protects only those raw videotapes and
photographs that contribute to the public debate. This prong ex-
pressly refuses to protect the media's use of raw films that simply
"restate" facts already known by the public. This prong recognizes
that using the First Amendment to deprive copyright protection
from videotapes or photographs that do not truly contribute to the
public debate improperly interferes with the copyright holder's
constitutional right to control the destiny of his work."
Under the third prong, the First Amendment privileges the
media's use of a copyrighted videotape or photograph only when
access to the videotape or photograph is unavailable through a me-
dium of communication, such as television, that is widely accessi-
ble by the public at no special cost. Under this prong, therefore,
public access to a raw videotape only through a movie theater or
through a private news clipping service would trigger the proposed
First Amendment exception. Access to the videotape or photo-
graph through any publicly accessible television station, however,
would preclude the need for the application of this First Amend-
ment exception. 9
This prong implicitly recognizes that the First Amendment
guarantee of a free press is threatened only when there is a public
need for access to a unique news videotape or photograph, not sim-
ply when the media desires access to the videotape for its own
commercial benefit. For example, prior to the first national televi-
sion broadcast of the Rodney King videotape, access to the video-
tape was unavailable through any public medium of communica-
tion; thus, the third prong was clearly satisfied. Under this prong,
however, this First Amendment exception to copyright should have
ceased to protect the media's use of the videotape once even the
one television station to which the cameraman sold his videotape
began to broadcast it. Indeed, under this prong, as long as even
one publicly accessible television station broadcasts a raw news
" See also Hoberman, 14 Pepperdine L Rev at 598 (cited in note 94) (proposing an
originality requirement under which the First Amendment protects the use of a copyrighted
work only when the speaker's work is sufficiently original that it contributes to the market-
place of ideas).
9' Unlike a "newsworthiness" requirement, this uniqueness requirement does not re-
quire a determination of the importance of the news event captured on film. In contrast,
this second prong protects films capturing any news event, regardless of its subjective "new-
sworthiness," as long as the film contains unique facts about the event.
9' The third prong is distinguishable from the second prong because the third prong is
concerned with the availability of public access to the film, while the second prong is con-
cerned with whether the content of the film contributes unique facts to the public debate.
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videotape, public access to the information is not deemed suffi-
ciently threatened to trigger the application of the First Amend-
ment copyright exception for other television stations. Under the
third prong, therefore, any subsequent television stations wishing
to air the Rodney King videotape should have obtained copyright
permission from the copyright holder, whether it be the camera-
man or the television station. 100
In construing the third prong, courts should look to the ex-
isting case law for guidance. The Ninth Circuit in Tullo, for exam-
ple, rejected a news service's First Amendment claim that its use
of copyrighted footage of a plane crash was privileged; the court
held that such a First Amendment claim was unwarranted because
"tapes were shown on local television programs immediately after
"1101the events and thus were freely available to the public ....
Under this standard, therefore, a First Amendment copyright ex-
ception is warranted only when there is a clear public need for ac-
cess to the captured news event, not simply when the media wishes
to broadcast a news videotape or photograph for its own benefit. 10 2
The strength and uniqueness of this proposed three-pronged
standard lies in its refusal to require that the copyrighted work in
question meet a level of "newsworthiness" in order to warrant pro-
tection by the First Amendment.103 The absence of such a criterion
0 Although this may appear to be an inequitable system with respect to those televi-
sion networks that must obtain permission from the copyright holder to broadcast the
videotape or photograph, to extend ready access to all television networks would unfairly
ignore the copyright holder's strong property interest in his work.
"' Tuo, 973 F2d at 796. In Pacific & Southern, the Eleventh Circuit also adopted this
reasoning in rejecting a First Amendment claim by an alleged infringer who videotaped the
plaintiff's news broadcast and sold tapes to the subjects of the news reports for profit. 744
F2d at 1490. The court held that because the public already had access to this material
through the plaintiff's news broadcast, and because the infringer did not offer the public any
additional access to the information, the infringer's actions fell far beyond whatever First
Amendment protections might be available to further the public interest. Id at 1498.
100 The Second Circuit also adopted this understanding of a public need for access in
Roy Export, where it rejected the defendant's First Amendment challenge to copyright on
the grounds that because the works of Charlie Chaplin were in the public domain, the public
already had sufficient access to that information. 672 F2d at 1100.
'03 Other First Amendment exception standards proposed by commentators have al-
most uniformly included such a "newsworthiness" or "public interest" criterion. See
Hoberman, 14 Pepperdine L Rev at 597 (cited in note 94) (the copyrighted work must ad-
vance "first amendment interests"); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 Colum L Rev 983, 988 (1970) (copyright infringement will be excused under the First
Amendment only if the use of the material independently advances "the public interest");
Denicola, 67 Cal L Rev at 314-15 (cited in note 94) (the use of the material must meet a
public value requirement); Comment, Bare-Faced Mess: Fair Use and the First Amend-
ment, 70 Or L Rev 211, 252 (1991) (the facts to be conveyed must be of "general public
importance").
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ensures that courts will not be forced to engage in unnecessary
speculation as to the public importance of the news event captured
on film. Indeed, many scholars who have themselves proposed
First Amendment copyright exceptions based on the "public im-
portance" of or the "public interest" in a copyrighted work have
acknowledged the danger of employing such criteria.1 4 The ab-
sence of such criteria from this proposed standard eliminates the
danger of making the scope of copyright protection dependent
upon an often futile and wasteful judicial inquiry into the news-
worthiness of a videotape or photograph; as noted by Harry
Kalven, Jr., an inquiry into a work's "newsworthiness" is generally
unhelpful because any matter can be deemed "newsworthy" solely
by reason of its publication in the press. 10 5 This three-part test,
therefore, focuses not on "newsworthiness," but on true public
need for otherwise inaccessible information.
CONCLUSION
As technological progress has facilitated the visual documenta-
tion of news events, the once harmonious relationship between
copyright and the First Amendment has changed for two reasons.
First, the media must increasingly use copyrighted raw news video-
tapes and photographs in order to keep the public fully informed.
Second, the fact-expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use,
by statutory definition and judicial construction, are no longer able
to fully accommodate the First Amendment problems created by
the extension of copyright to these graphic, visual works of
authorship.
An independent First Amendment exception to copyright,
such as that proposed in this Comment, can accommodate those
unique free press concerns left clearly unresolved by the fact-
expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use. Indeed, the cur-
rent refusal to address the pressing First Amendment problems
created by the extension of copyright to raw news videotapes and
photographs sacrifices the First Amendment's guarantee of a free
press to copyright law's inability to accommodate technological
progress. A limited First Amendment exception to copyright is
necessary to redress this shortcoming in current copyright law.
104 See, for example, Denicola, 67 Cal L Rev at 315 (cited in note 94).
100 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts &
Walker, 1967 S Ct Rev 267, 284 (citing Time, Inc. v Hill, 385 US at 400-01).
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